Patent opinions from the Eastern District of Texas and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Weekly Digest
E.D. Tex.

Klausner Technologies, Inc. v. Vonage Holdings Corp. et al, No. 2:06-cv-00275 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2007)

Claims Construed
Court
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Marshall Division
Case No.
No. 2:06-cv-00275, Dkt. No. 116
Decided
August 7, 2007
Judge
John D. Love, M.J. — Tyler
Document
Order
Docket Entry
MEMORANDUM AND OPINION AND ORDER - for the foregoing reasons the court interprets the claim language in this case in the manner set forth herein
Length
23 pages

Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Documenti116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 1 of 23 PagelD #:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MARSHALL DIVISION

KLAUSNER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., §

a New York Corporation § §

Plaintiff §

§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:06¢v275

VS. § §

VONAGE HOLDINGS CORP, §

a Delaware Corporation, VONAGE §

AMERICA, INC., a Delaware §

Corporation § §

Defendant § §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Figure on page 1 of the opinion

This claim construction opinion construes terms in U.S. Patent No. 5, 572, 576 (“the “576

- patent”). Plaintiff Klausner Technologies, Inc. (“Klausner”) accuses Defendants Vonage Holdings

Corp. and Vonage America, Inc. (collectively “Vonage”) of infringing Claims 3 and 4! of this patent.

The Patent

The ‘576 patent describes, and the asserted claims 3 and 4 recite, a method of automatically

answering incoming telephone calls and storing and retrieving information from the incoming

telephone calls. The method utilizes a telephone answering device that includes a memory and is

coupled to atelephone. The method involves, in general terms, receiving signals that specify a caller

and receiving a voice message from the caller. The voice message is stored in the memory of the

telephone answering device, and the signals specifying the caller are linked to the voice message.

The signals specifying the caller, having been linked to the voice message, may be transmitted to a

‘Claim 4 depends from Claim 3 and, therefore, the terms construed below apply to Claim 4 as well.

Figure on page 2 of the opinion

2Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Documenti116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 2 of 23 PagelD #:

“user remote access device” and may assist in the selective retrieval of the stored voice message.

When a voice message is selected, it is transmitted to the “user remote access device.” The

described method allows a user to select which voice messages he or she is interested in retrieving

and provides for the playback of the selected voice message(s).

Applicable Law

“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to

which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381

F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). In claim construction, courts examine the patent’s intrinsic

define the scope of the patented invention. See id.; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical evidence to

F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Comme ‘ns Group, Corp., 388

F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). This intrinsic evidence includes the claims themselves, Inc., 262

the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; CR. Bard, Inc., 388

Courts give claim terms their ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one F.3d at 861.

skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the entire patent. Phillips, of ordinary

415 F.3d at 1312-13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm'n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

The claims themselves provide substantial guidance in determining the meaning of particular

claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. First, a term’s context in the asserted claim can be very

instructive. Jd. Other asserted or unasserted claims can also aid in determining the claim’s meaning

because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. /d. Differences among

terms can also assist in understanding a term’s meaning. Jd. For example, when a the claim

dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that the independent claim3 Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Documenti116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 3 of 23 PagelD #:

Figure on page 3 of the opinion

does not include the limitation. /d. at 1314-15.

be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” Id. (quoting Claims “must

Markman vy. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “{T]he specification

‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single

best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”” Jd. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,

90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325

(Fed. Cir. 2002). This is true because a patentee may define his own terms, give a claim term a

the term would otherwise possess, or disclaim or disavow certain claim different meaning than

F.3d at 1316. In these situations, the inventor’s lexicography governs. Id, scope. Phillips, 415

Also, the specification may resolve any ambiguity in the meaning of claim terms “where the ordinary

and accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope

of the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1325. But,

“although the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language,

particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into

the claims.” Comark Commens, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also

1323. The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for Phillips, 415 F.3d at

patent applicant may also define a term in prosecuting the patent. claim construction because a

Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc., 381 ¥.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“As in the case of

the specification, a patent applicant may define a term in prosecuting a patent.”).

Although extrinsic evidence can be useful, it is “less significant than the intrinsic record in

determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quoting

C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a court understand4 Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Documenti116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 4 of 23 PagelD #:

Figure on page 4 of the opinion

the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might use claim terms, but

dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too broad or may not be technical

of how the term is used in the patent. Jd. at 1318. Similarly, expert testimony may aid indicative

a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining the particular meaning ofa term

an expert’s conclusory, unsupported assertions as to a term’s definition is in the pertinent field, but

a court. Jd. Generally, extrinsic evidence is “less reliable than the patent and entirely unhelpful to

its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms.” Jd.

The Terms

The terms at issue are:? “automatically answering incoming telephone calls,” “telephone

answering device,” “coupled to a telephone,” “first signals,” “corresponding voice message,” “user

remote access device,” “transmitting said received first signals to a user remote access device,” and

“transmitting to a user remote access device at least one specific voice message linked to a specific

one of said received first signais.”

1, “automatically answering incoming telephone calls”

Klausner believes this term need not be construed while Vonage contends that this term

should be construed to mean “sensing an incoming ring signal on the called party’s telephone line

and putting the called party’s telephone line in an off-hook state.” To support its contention, Vonage

primarily relies upon Figures 3A and 3B and the corresponding text in the specification, arguing that

these figures “illustrate” the “answer mode of the present invention” and not merely an embodiment

2 At the Markman hearing, the parties agreed that the term “each incoming call” need not be construed.

>The parties appear to agree that although “automatically answering incoming telephone calls,” “telephone answering device,” and “coupled to a telephone” are contained in the preamble to Claim 3, these terms are limiting and amenable to construction.

Figure on page 5 of the opinion

5Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Document116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 5 of 23 PagelD #:

of the invention. See Col. 3:27-28; Col. 6:10-11. Vonage also contends, essentially, that because the

specification describes a single way of “answering incoming telephone calls,” the term should be

limited to that embodiment. In response, Klausner asserts that Vonage is improperly limiting the

phrase to a specific embodiment. The Court agrees with Klausner.

It is important to remember that although the specification often describes very specific

embodiments of the invention, the Federal Circuit has cautioned against confining the claims to those

embodiments. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. The roles of the specification are to “teach and enable

those of skill in the art how to make and use the invention and to provide a best mode for doing so.

One of the best ways to teach a person of ordinary skill how to make and use the invention is to

provide an example of how to practice the invention in a particular case.” Id. ‘“[T]he claims of the

patent, not its specifications, measure the invention.” Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water

Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “Accordingly,

particular embodiments appearing in the written description will not be used to limit claim language

that has broader effect. And, even where a patent describes only a single embodiment, claims wiil

not be ‘restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope

‘using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.”” /d. at 1117 (citations omitted).

Vonage argues that, where the patent specification makes clear that what is described is “the

invention” rather than simply “an embodiment” of the invention, the claims may be limited to that

description. It is true that where a patent clearly indicates that the description is that of “the

invention” and not simply “an embodiment,” that indication should be taken into account in

construing the claim terms at issue. However, as is discussed below, in this particular case, the

patent specification is not so clear as to be directing its description, in any aspect, to “the invention”6 Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Documenti116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 6 of 23 PagelD #:

Figure on page 6 of the opinion

as opposed to an embodiment of the invention.

The Court begins, as it must, with the words of the claim. See Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1324;

Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The terms see also CCS Fitness,

a presumption that they mean what they say and have the ordinary meaning used in the claims bear

to those words by persons skilled in the relevant art.”). Vonage does not that would be attributed

to support its contention. Indeed, Claim 3 cannot be read to define rely on the language of Claim 3

the term as Vonage suggests. Claim 3 simply requires a “method of automatically answering

incoming telephone calls and storing and retrieving information from the incoming telephone calls.”

While not determinative, Klausner presents evidence, which Vonage does not meaningfully dispute,

that one skilled in the art would understand “automatically answering telephone calls” as answering

telephone calls without human intervention and not limited in the fashion Vonage proposes. See Ex.

25 to Pl.’s Claim Const. Br. {J 26-28.

Vonage argues that Figures 3A, 3B, 4 and 5 are described as “illustrating [various features]

of the present invention.” According to Vonage, this language clearly indicates that what is shown

in these Figures represents the invention itself and is not simply illustrative ofan embodiment of the

invention. The Figures are first discussed in the section titled “Brief Description of the Drawings.”

This section begins with the statement that the “above and other objects and advantages will become

the art upon reviewing the detailed description of the preferred apparent to those skilled in

embodiments in conjunction with a review of the appended drawings. . .” See Col. 3:18-21. These

drawings are then further discussed in the section titled “Detailed Description of the Preferred

Embodiments.” This section concludes with the statement that “[w]hile the embodiments shown and

described are fully capable of achieving the objects of the invention, it is to be understood that these7 Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Document116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 7 of 23 PagelD #:

Figure on page 7 of the opinion

embodiments are shown only for the purpose of illustration and not for the purpose of limitation.”

Col. 12:61-64.

At several points in the discussion of Figures 3A and 3B, the figures are described as

“preferably” containing certain characteristics. See, e.g., Col. 6:30-31 (“The microcontroller then

preferably multiplies this number by 6 . . .”); Col. 6:44-45 (“The OGM is preferably stored as

message #1 in memory 2.”); Col. 6:48-49 (“When the playing of the OGM is completed, the

microcontroller preferably waits 5 seconds (block 160).”). While Vonage argues the description of

Figures 3A and 3B define what is meant by answering an incoming telephone call, Vonage does not

request that other characteristics of the figures be included in the definition of the term. See, e.g.,

Fig. 3, the TAD first determines if the user has pressed a key on the Col. 6:14-24 (“As illustrated in

TAD (Decision Block 100). This is done by means of the microcontroller reading RS232 serial data

port connected to the touch screen 5 through connection to determine if the screen has been touched.

..).

Moreover, Figure 3B includes a “DTMF DECODE ROUTINE 230", which is further

And, as Vonage points out in its brief, Figure 5 uses the “present invention” described in Figure 5.

5 as “illustrating a flow chart illustrating the DTMF decode routine language in describing Figure

of the present invention.” However, at column 9, lines 51-54, the patent specification states that “[1]t

is to be understood that any incoming signals over the telephone line with a voice message that is

generally unique to the caller may be used instead of DTMF tones.” recognizable by the TAD and is

Thus, the patent specification is clear that DTMF tones need not be used, and accordingly, the DIMF

decode routine of Figure 5, and as shown in Figure 3B, need not be used. Rather, other incoming

signals may be used instead. The clear implication of the patent specification, taken as a whole and8 Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Document116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 8 of 23 PagelD #:

Figure on page 8 of the opinion

not focusing strictly on the descriptions of the Figures, is that Figures 3A and 3B illustrate an

embodiment of the invention, an embodiment in which DTMF tones, and a DTMF decode routine

are used.

a case where the Federal Circuit has held that describing Vonage does not cite the Court to

figures as “illustrating . .. the present invention” alone amounts to a clear intention to limit claim

the specification. See Innova/Pure Water, Inc., 381 F.3d scope to a specific embodiment taught in

at 1117. Itis worth noting that the terms “illustrating,” “illustration,” “illustrates,” and “illustrated”

are used throughout the patent. See, e.g., Col. 3:42-43 (“Fig. 10 is an illustration of the display

recalling information linked to one of the callers.”); Col. 3:44-45 (“Fig. 1lisa flowchart illustrating

a typical operation of the present invention.”); Col. 3:65-66 (Fig. 1 illustrates the front perspective

(TAD) 25 according to the invention.”); Col. 6:14 (“As view of a telephone answering device

illustrated in Fig. 3. ..”). Thus, the term “illustrating” would not seem to necessarily lead to the

conclusion that claim scope is limited to the “illustrated” embodiments.

The specification does not teach that the specific embodiment described in the figures is

somehow important or vital to what is claimed. Put another way, the specification does not teach

that this embodiment is the only way to accomplish the answer mode of the invention. Indeed, as

already pointed out, Vonage does not request that all features shown in Figures 3A and 3B be

incorporated into “the invention” as claimed. If Figures 3A and 3B were considered as illustrating

“the invention” instead of simply an embodiment, the Court would not be at liberty to pick and

3B to include and which to not include. And the choose which aspects of Figures 3A and

specification does not provide guidance as to how such determinations might be made.

prosecution of the ‘576 patent, Klausner expressly Vonage also asserts that during

Figure on page 9 of the opinion

9Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Document116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 9 of 23 PagelD #:

distinguished methods of automatically answering telephone calls with a “telephone answering

a computer-based voice messaging system. See Ex. 2 to Vonage’s device” from methods using

Claim Constr. Br. at 12. The Court disagrees. The cited excerpt from the prosecution history shows

was no motivation or suggestion to combine a 1981 patent issued the inventors arguing that there

5,003,577 issued to Ertz. The Court does not find this portion of to Klausner and U.S. Patent No.

the prosecution history to disclaim computer based voice messaging systems, but rather to be

addressing the examiner’s conclusion that certain claims were obvious in light of the referenced prior

art.

The Court is not persuaded that one skilled in the art would read the intrinsic evidence as

exclusion or restriction such that the answer mode of the invention containing explicit expressions of

was limited to the embodiment set forth in Figures 3A and 3B. Cf Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v.

Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,242 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the common

specification leads to the “inescapable conclusion” that patents had disclaimed a particular

configuration). Further, the Court finds this phrase understandable to a juror in the context of the

claims at issue and, therefore, does not require construction.

2. “telephone answering device”

By the time of the hearing, Klausner proposed that this term be construed as “an electronic

device for answering telephone calls,” while Vonage proposed “a device for answering an incoming

telephone call.” Vonage does not appear to seriously dispute the inclusion of “electronic” in the

definition of this term. Nor does there appear to be any serious dispute to including the word

as the preamble of Claim 3 describes “storing and retrieving “incoming” in the definition

calls with a telephone answering device.” Throughout the information from the incoming telephone

Figure on page 10 of the opinion

10‘576 patent, the telephone answering device is described as a device that can receive, store and

retrieve messages left by a calling party, i.e., messages coming in to a called party. See, e.g., ‘576

patent, col. 5:23-31, 34-40. Accordingly, the Court construes this term as “an electronic device for

answering an incoming telephone call.”

3. “coupled to a telephone”

Klausner proposes “connected to a telephone so that signals are transferred from one to the

other,” while Vonage proposes “connected to the called party’s telephone line.” The primary dispute

here is whether the telephone access device (“TAD”) is connected to the “called party’s telephone

line.” Vonage argues that the TAD must be connected to the “called party’s telephone line” because

the specification limits the invention to the answer mode described in Figures 3A and 3B. For the

reasons discussed above, the Court rejects this argument. In light of the preamble’s description of

the method as one of “automatically answering incoming telephone calls and storing and retrieving

information from the incoming telephone calls,” the Court finds Klausner’s proposal to be deficient

specification simply describes the telephone answering device as being as well. The patent

connected to the telephone line that receives an incoming call. ‘576 patent, col. 5:41-44.

Accordingly, the Court construes this term as “connected to a telephone receiving an incoming call.”

A, “first signals”

term needs no construction. Vonage proposes “signals received Klausner contends that the

with a voice message recognizable by the telephone answering device and generally unique to the

proposal, Vonage cites to a portion of the specification that provides “[i]t is caller.” To support its

to be understood that any incoming signals over the telephone line with a voice message that is

and is generally unique to the caller may be used instead of DTMF tones.” recognizable by the TAD

Figure on page 11 of the opinion

11See Col. 9:51-54.

The claim language itself describes the “first signals” as “specifying each caller of each

incoming call.” See Col. 13:47-48. The Court fails to see how the portion of the specification cited

by Vonage does anything more than clarify that signals other than “DTMF tones” may be used to

specify the caller. To hold that this statement constitutes the exclusive definition of the term would

seem to clearly import unnecessary limitations into the claim language. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at

1323. Moreover, the proposed limitations, “recognizable by the telephone answering device” and

“generally unique to the caller,” are ambiguous and could inject confusion into the construction.

The Court notes that in the prosecution history of the ‘236 patent’, the Applicant describes

“signal” as a “[g]eneral term referring to a conveyor of information.” See Ex. 12 to Klausner’s

Claim Constr. Br. at 7. Also, the Applicant refers to “caller identity information,” “identifying

information” and “caller identifying information.” See Ex. 6 to Klausner Opening Br., p. 21, and Ex.

7 to Klausner Opening Br., p. 20.

the meaning of “first signals” in the context of the patent is The Court finds that

“information.”

5. “corresponding voice message”

construction, while Vonage urges “the voice message received by the Klaunser proposes no

telephone answering device with the first signal.” The Court finds that a construction is necessary

to avoid potential confusion as to what the voice message corresponds to. The patent specification

describes the telephone answering device receiving voice messages and DTMF tones during a cal!

e.g., ‘576 patent, col. 7:19-51. Thus, the Court adopts Vonage’s and linking them together. See,

“The ‘576 patent is a continuation of the application that resulted in the “236 patent.

1]

Figure on page 12 of the opinion

12proposal and construes this term to mean “the voice message received by the telephone answering

device with the first signal.”

6. “user remote access device”

Klausner proposes “a device that can from any remote location gain authenticated access to

internal system resources from outside the system that does not require separate data and voice

channels to communicate with the telephone answering device.” Vonages proposes “the user remote

access device having the structure specified in Claim 1.” In support ofits proposal, Vonage contends

that “user remote access device” is not discussed in the written description’ but is expressly defined

only in terms of means-plus-function elements in Claim 1. Vonage argues that because there is a

presumption that the same terms appearing in different claims have the same meanings, the term

“user remote access device” should be defined in all claims as it is in Claim 1. Vonage’s argument

is without merit.

on the idea that a “user remote access device” is different from Vonage’s argument hinges

a “remote access device.” See Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1333

n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use

of .. . different terms in the claims connotes different meanings”). Although different terms in a

patent are presumed to have different meanings, that presumption is overcome in this case. Claim

2, which depends from Claim 1, references the “user remote access device” of Claim | by calling

Moreover, independent Claims 5 and 20 use the terms “remote access it a “remote access device.”

device” and “user remote access device” interchangeably within the same claim. Thus, Vonage’s

proposed construction would have the effect of importing the limitations of Claim 1 into all claims

>The term “remote access device” is discussed but not “user remote access device.”

Figure on page 13 of the opinion

13when claims 2 and 5-13 include a “remote access device” that contains different elements.

Vonage also argues that the prosecution history shows that Claim 1 defines this term because

the inventors amended Claim 1 to clarify that a “user remote access device” includes the means-plus-

d by Klausner, however, the examiner expressed function elements in part (b) of Claim 1. As note

with the term “system independent user remote access device.” (“Regarding claim 15 concern

Claim 1], it is not clear if a ‘user remote access device (line 11)’ and “‘a system-independent [current

    • o Klausner’s Reply Br. at 4, In response, the remote access device (line 15) are the same.”). Ex. 27 t

removed “system independent” to “make the claim language consistent.” Ex. 7 to inventors

t conclude that such an amendment reflects an Klausner’s Claim Constr. Br. at 20. The Court canno

Claim 3 in terms of the means-plus-function intention to define the “user remote access device” of

limitations of Claim 1.

Finally, contrary to Vonage’s contention, Claim 1 is not defining a “user remote access

device” or a “remote access device.” Instead, the claim sets forth elements included in the “user

access device” for purposes of that claim. A claim’s elements establish the boundaries of that remote

particular claim term. Indeed, Claims 2 and claim, Jnnova, 381 F.3d at 1115, rather than define a

s device” but none of these claims purport to 5-13 set forth different elements of a “remote acces

define the term. Vonage does not cite to any authority holding that means-plus-function elements

in an independent claim can be used to define a term appearing in another independent claim.°

a rebuttable presumption that different claims are of different scope.” Amgen, Inc. v. “There is

The Court finds this situation distinguishable from the case cited by Vonage, PODS, inc. v. Porta Store, Inc., 484

(Fed. Cir. 2007). In that case, the parties agreed on the definition of “carrier frame” in Claim 1 and there F.3d 1359 was no reason to fail to apply that definition to the term as used in another claim. Here, the parties have not agreed on a definition for “user access remote device” and Vonage is attempting to restrict the meaning of a term by way of an independent claim’s means-plus-function elements, not by way of some sort of definition.

Figure on page 14 of the opinion

14Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Vonage has not rebutted this

presumption here.

The construction proposed by Klausner suffers from its own deficiencies. Klausner proposes

“a device that can from any remote location gain authenticated access to internal system resources

from outside the system and that does not require separate data and voice channels to communicate

with the telephone answering device.” Klausner points principally to the prosecution history to

support various aspects of its proposed construction. However, the Court does not find adequate

support for certain aspects of Klausner’s proposal. Klausner refers to an Amendment, dated April

3, 1995, in which the Applicant distinguishes a prior art reference to Jachmann. In his argument, the

Applicant said that “Jachmann does not disclose a flexible and system-independent remote device

that may be used from any remote location to access any TAD wherein visual messages are displayed

on the system-independent remote device.” See Ex. 6 to Klausner Opening Br., p. 28. But, in this

particular argument, the Applicant actually relied on two specific differences to distinguish

Jachmann; namely the “system-independent” remote device, and the fact that, in Jachmann, “remote

retrieval of information must be accomplished without use of any visual messages.” Jd. The

“system-independent” aspect of the claims at issue was deleted in a subsequent Amendment.

Klausner points to its expert Levine as support for that portion of its proposal reciting “from

location gain authenticated access to internal system resources from outside the system.” any remote

Klausner points to nothing specific in the intrinsic record to support these restrictions, However,

other than the notion that access to voice messages is typically intended to be limited or controlled.

The reference to “internal system resources” does not aid in the understanding of the subject claim

term, at least in the context of the asserted claims of the ‘576 patent. Those claims do not expressly15 recite a “system,” nor is a “system” implicitly required. Hence, inclusion of a requirement of

Figure on page 15 of the opinion

“authenticated access to internal system resources from outside the system” interjects limitations not

reasonably connected to any other claim requirement and will likely only cause confusion to a lay

jury. Certainly the word “remote” carries with it the connotation that some distance, and perhaps

a considerable distance, may exist between the remote access device and the telephone answering

device. Dr. Levine, Klausner’s expert, describes that distance as “any distant location” and having

“no range limit on access.” Levine Decl. 451. Klausner’s proposed language of “from any remote

location” adequately describes this limitation.

Finally, Klausner proposes that the term “remote access device” be construed to require that

the device “does not require separate data and voice channels to communicate with the telephone

answering device.” Klausner points to an Amendment dated November 10, 1995, in which the

Applicant again distinguished the Jachmann reference. Klausner points to the Applicant’s statement

that “in the preferred embodiment of Jachmann, two separate data paths are required for retrieving

voice messages.” Therefore, argues Klausner, the “remote access device” of the claims must not

require two separate channels. However, in the November 10, 1995 Amendment, the Applicant went

on to acknowledge that a second embodiment shown by Jachmann “arguably uses only a telephone

link to convey both voice and data information.” See Ex. 7 to Klausner Opening Br., pp. 24-25. But,

said the Applicant, in that second embodiment of J achmann, the user may be restricted in his use of

the single telephone link to only certain times of the day. Thus, the Applicant argued that the

distinction between the claimed invention and the disclosure of Jachmann lie in the fact that, in the

claimed invention, the “first signals are available upon user demand.” Jd. The prosecution history

is insufficient to show that the Applicant surrendered claim scope regarding the number of channels16 required for transmission of voice and data. See Sorenson v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 427 F.3d 1375,

Figure on page 16 of the opinion

1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“in order to disavow claim scope, a patent applicant must clearly and

unambiguously express surrender of subject matter during prosecution’’).

For the reasons expressed above, the Court construes the terms “user remote access device”

and “remote access device” identically to mean “a device that can gain access to voice messages

stored on the telephone answering device from a remote location.”

7. “transmitting said received first signals to a user remote access device”

Klausner advocates no construction, while Vonages proposes “the telephone answering

device outputs the first signals over a single telephone link to a user remote access device.” Vonage

contends that the prosecution history shows that the first signals must be transmitted over a single

telephone link. The Court disagrees.

The prosecution history excerpt cited by Vonage demonstrates that first signals may be

transmitted over a single telephone link. See Ex. 3 to Def.’s Claim Constr. Br. at 24-25 (“the

presently claimed invention may use a single telephone link for conveying both voice and data

information’’and “the presently claimed invention places no limitation whatsoever on when a user

may retrieve messages using a single telephone link”). See also the above discussion of these

passages from the prosecution history. Further, the prosecution history provides that “signals may

be transmitted through any medium, including but not limited to, DTMF tones over a telephone line,

radio waves, etc.” See Ex. 8 to Klausner’s Claim Constr. Br. at 11-12. Thus, the Court declines to

adopt Vonage’s proposal and finds this phrase needs no construction apart from the constructions

of “first signals” and “user remote access device” already given.

Figure on page 17 of the opinion

178. “transmitting to a user remote access device at least one specific voice message linked to a

specific one of said received first signals”

Klausner argues this term needs no construction apart from the construction of “user remote

access device.” Vonage proposes “the telephone answering device plays back the voice message to

the user remote access device over the single telephone link between the telephone answering device

and user remote access device.”

Among other things, Vonage proposes that this phrase requires “play back” by the telephone

answering device. While “play back” of a voice message may be one action taken to accomplish the

transmission of the voice message, the concept of “play back” does not appear to be inherent in the

word “transmitting,” nor does Vonage point to anything in the intrinsic record, aside from a specific

embodiment described in the specification, suggesting otherwise. The Court declines to incorporate

details of a disclosed embodiment into a claim term in the absence of clear direction otherwise from

the intrinsic record. See, e.g., Varco, L.P. v. Pason Sys. USA, Corp., 436 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.

2006) (“In examining the specification for proper context . . . this court will not at any time import

limitations from the specification into the claims.”). Vonage also argues the requirement of using

a “single telephone link” between the telephone answering device” and the “user remote access

device.” That argument has been addressed above.

these reasons as well as those discussed in the previous section, the Court rejects For

Vonage’s proposed construction and finds that this phrase needs no construction.

Figure on page 18 of the opinion

18| #: <pagelD>

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court interprets the claim language in this case in the manner

set forth above. For ease of reference, the Court’s claim interpretations are set forth in a table

attached to this opinion.

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 7th day of August, 2007.

febrP Fre UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Cite this opinion

Klausner Technologies, Inc. v. Vonage Holdings Corp. et al, No. 2:06-cv-00275 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2007).

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