Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Documenti116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 1 of 23 PagelD #:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MARSHALL DIVISION
KLAUSNER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., §
a New York Corporation § §
Plaintiff §
§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:06¢v275
VS. § §
VONAGE HOLDINGS CORP, §
a Delaware Corporation, VONAGE §
AMERICA, INC., a Delaware §
Corporation § §
Defendant § §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This claim construction opinion construes terms in U.S. Patent No. 5, 572, 576 (“the “576
- patent”). Plaintiff Klausner Technologies, Inc. (“Klausner”) accuses Defendants Vonage Holdings
Corp. and Vonage America, Inc. (collectively “Vonage”) of infringing Claims 3 and 4! of this patent.
The Patent
The ‘576 patent describes, and the asserted claims 3 and 4 recite, a method of automatically
answering incoming telephone calls and storing and retrieving information from the incoming
telephone calls. The method utilizes a telephone answering device that includes a memory and is
coupled to atelephone. The method involves, in general terms, receiving signals that specify a caller
and receiving a voice message from the caller. The voice message is stored in the memory of the
telephone answering device, and the signals specifying the caller are linked to the voice message.
The signals specifying the caller, having been linked to the voice message, may be transmitted to a
‘Claim 4 depends from Claim 3 and, therefore, the terms construed below apply to Claim 4 as well.

2Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Documenti116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 2 of 23 PagelD #:
“user remote access device” and may assist in the selective retrieval of the stored voice message.
When a voice message is selected, it is transmitted to the “user remote access device.” The
described method allows a user to select which voice messages he or she is interested in retrieving
and provides for the playback of the selected voice message(s).
Applicable Law
“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to
which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381
F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). In claim construction, courts examine the patent’s intrinsic
define the scope of the patented invention. See id.; C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical evidence to
F.3d 858, 861 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Comme ‘ns Group, Corp., 388
F.3d 1258, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2001). This intrinsic evidence includes the claims themselves, Inc., 262
the specification, and the prosecution history. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; CR. Bard, Inc., 388
Courts give claim terms their ordinary and accustomed meaning as understood by one F.3d at 861.
skill in the art at the time of the invention in the context of the entire patent. Phillips, of ordinary
415 F.3d at 1312-13; Alloc, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm'n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
The claims themselves provide substantial guidance in determining the meaning of particular
claim terms. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. First, a term’s context in the asserted claim can be very
instructive. Jd. Other asserted or unasserted claims can also aid in determining the claim’s meaning
because claim terms are typically used consistently throughout the patent. /d. Differences among
terms can also assist in understanding a term’s meaning. Jd. For example, when a the claim
dependent claim adds a limitation to an independent claim, it is presumed that the independent claim3 Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Documenti116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 3 of 23 PagelD #:

does not include the limitation. /d. at 1314-15.
be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” Id. (quoting Claims “must
Markman vy. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “{T]he specification
‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single
best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”” Jd. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,
90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2002). This is true because a patentee may define his own terms, give a claim term a
the term would otherwise possess, or disclaim or disavow certain claim different meaning than
F.3d at 1316. In these situations, the inventor’s lexicography governs. Id, scope. Phillips, 415
Also, the specification may resolve any ambiguity in the meaning of claim terms “where the ordinary
and accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the scope
of the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, Inc., 299 F.3d at 1325. But,
“although the specification may aid the court in interpreting the meaning of disputed claim language,
particular embodiments and examples appearing in the specification will not generally be read into
the claims.” Comark Commens, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also
1323. The prosecution history is another tool to supply the proper context for Phillips, 415 F.3d at
patent applicant may also define a term in prosecuting the patent. claim construction because a
Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc., 381 ¥.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“As in the case of
the specification, a patent applicant may define a term in prosecuting a patent.”).
Although extrinsic evidence can be useful, it is “less significant than the intrinsic record in
determining ‘the legally operative meaning of claim language.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317 (quoting
C.R. Bard, Inc., 388 F.3d at 862). Technical dictionaries and treatises may help a court understand4 Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Documenti116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 4 of 23 PagelD #:

the underlying technology and the manner in which one skilled in the art might use claim terms, but
dictionaries and treatises may provide definitions that are too broad or may not be technical
of how the term is used in the patent. Jd. at 1318. Similarly, expert testimony may aid indicative
a court in understanding the underlying technology and determining the particular meaning ofa term
an expert’s conclusory, unsupported assertions as to a term’s definition is in the pertinent field, but
a court. Jd. Generally, extrinsic evidence is “less reliable than the patent and entirely unhelpful to
its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms.” Jd.
The Terms
The terms at issue are:? “automatically answering incoming telephone calls,” “telephone
answering device,” “coupled to a telephone,” “first signals,” “corresponding voice message,” “user
remote access device,” “transmitting said received first signals to a user remote access device,” and
“transmitting to a user remote access device at least one specific voice message linked to a specific
one of said received first signais.”
1, “automatically answering incoming telephone calls”
Klausner believes this term need not be construed while Vonage contends that this term
should be construed to mean “sensing an incoming ring signal on the called party’s telephone line
and putting the called party’s telephone line in an off-hook state.” To support its contention, Vonage
primarily relies upon Figures 3A and 3B and the corresponding text in the specification, arguing that
these figures “illustrate” the “answer mode of the present invention” and not merely an embodiment
2 At the Markman hearing, the parties agreed that the term “each incoming call” need not be construed.
>The parties appear to agree that although “automatically answering incoming telephone calls,” “telephone answering device,” and “coupled to a telephone” are contained in the preamble to Claim 3, these terms are limiting and amenable to construction.

5Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Document116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 5 of 23 PagelD #:
of the invention. See Col. 3:27-28; Col. 6:10-11. Vonage also contends, essentially, that because the
specification describes a single way of “answering incoming telephone calls,” the term should be
limited to that embodiment. In response, Klausner asserts that Vonage is improperly limiting the
phrase to a specific embodiment. The Court agrees with Klausner.
It is important to remember that although the specification often describes very specific
embodiments of the invention, the Federal Circuit has cautioned against confining the claims to those
embodiments. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323. The roles of the specification are to “teach and enable
those of skill in the art how to make and use the invention and to provide a best mode for doing so.
One of the best ways to teach a person of ordinary skill how to make and use the invention is to
provide an example of how to practice the invention in a particular case.” Id. ‘“[T]he claims of the
patent, not its specifications, measure the invention.” Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water
Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “Accordingly,
particular embodiments appearing in the written description will not be used to limit claim language
that has broader effect. And, even where a patent describes only a single embodiment, claims wiil
not be ‘restrictively unless the patentee has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope
‘using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction.”” /d. at 1117 (citations omitted).
Vonage argues that, where the patent specification makes clear that what is described is “the
invention” rather than simply “an embodiment” of the invention, the claims may be limited to that
description. It is true that where a patent clearly indicates that the description is that of “the
invention” and not simply “an embodiment,” that indication should be taken into account in
construing the claim terms at issue. However, as is discussed below, in this particular case, the
patent specification is not so clear as to be directing its description, in any aspect, to “the invention”6 Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Documenti116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 6 of 23 PagelD #:

as opposed to an embodiment of the invention.
The Court begins, as it must, with the words of the claim. See Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1324;
Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The terms see also CCS Fitness,
a presumption that they mean what they say and have the ordinary meaning used in the claims bear
to those words by persons skilled in the relevant art.”). Vonage does not that would be attributed
to support its contention. Indeed, Claim 3 cannot be read to define rely on the language of Claim 3
the term as Vonage suggests. Claim 3 simply requires a “method of automatically answering
incoming telephone calls and storing and retrieving information from the incoming telephone calls.”
While not determinative, Klausner presents evidence, which Vonage does not meaningfully dispute,
that one skilled in the art would understand “automatically answering telephone calls” as answering
telephone calls without human intervention and not limited in the fashion Vonage proposes. See Ex.
25 to Pl.’s Claim Const. Br. {J 26-28.
Vonage argues that Figures 3A, 3B, 4 and 5 are described as “illustrating [various features]
of the present invention.” According to Vonage, this language clearly indicates that what is shown
in these Figures represents the invention itself and is not simply illustrative ofan embodiment of the
invention. The Figures are first discussed in the section titled “Brief Description of the Drawings.”
This section begins with the statement that the “above and other objects and advantages will become
the art upon reviewing the detailed description of the preferred apparent to those skilled in
embodiments in conjunction with a review of the appended drawings. . .” See Col. 3:18-21. These
drawings are then further discussed in the section titled “Detailed Description of the Preferred
Embodiments.” This section concludes with the statement that “[w]hile the embodiments shown and
described are fully capable of achieving the objects of the invention, it is to be understood that these7 Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Document116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 7 of 23 PagelD #:

embodiments are shown only for the purpose of illustration and not for the purpose of limitation.”
Col. 12:61-64.
At several points in the discussion of Figures 3A and 3B, the figures are described as
“preferably” containing certain characteristics. See, e.g., Col. 6:30-31 (“The microcontroller then
preferably multiplies this number by 6 . . .”); Col. 6:44-45 (“The OGM is preferably stored as
message #1 in memory 2.”); Col. 6:48-49 (“When the playing of the OGM is completed, the
microcontroller preferably waits 5 seconds (block 160).”). While Vonage argues the description of
Figures 3A and 3B define what is meant by answering an incoming telephone call, Vonage does not
request that other characteristics of the figures be included in the definition of the term. See, e.g.,
Fig. 3, the TAD first determines if the user has pressed a key on the Col. 6:14-24 (“As illustrated in
TAD (Decision Block 100). This is done by means of the microcontroller reading RS232 serial data
port connected to the touch screen 5 through connection to determine if the screen has been touched.
..).
Moreover, Figure 3B includes a “DTMF DECODE ROUTINE 230", which is further
And, as Vonage points out in its brief, Figure 5 uses the “present invention” described in Figure 5.
5 as “illustrating a flow chart illustrating the DTMF decode routine language in describing Figure
of the present invention.” However, at column 9, lines 51-54, the patent specification states that “[1]t
is to be understood that any incoming signals over the telephone line with a voice message that is
generally unique to the caller may be used instead of DTMF tones.” recognizable by the TAD and is
Thus, the patent specification is clear that DTMF tones need not be used, and accordingly, the DIMF
decode routine of Figure 5, and as shown in Figure 3B, need not be used. Rather, other incoming
signals may be used instead. The clear implication of the patent specification, taken as a whole and8 Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Document116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 8 of 23 PagelD #:

not focusing strictly on the descriptions of the Figures, is that Figures 3A and 3B illustrate an
embodiment of the invention, an embodiment in which DTMF tones, and a DTMF decode routine
are used.
a case where the Federal Circuit has held that describing Vonage does not cite the Court to
figures as “illustrating . .. the present invention” alone amounts to a clear intention to limit claim
the specification. See Innova/Pure Water, Inc., 381 F.3d scope to a specific embodiment taught in
at 1117. Itis worth noting that the terms “illustrating,” “illustration,” “illustrates,” and “illustrated”
are used throughout the patent. See, e.g., Col. 3:42-43 (“Fig. 10 is an illustration of the display
recalling information linked to one of the callers.”); Col. 3:44-45 (“Fig. 1lisa flowchart illustrating
a typical operation of the present invention.”); Col. 3:65-66 (Fig. 1 illustrates the front perspective
(TAD) 25 according to the invention.”); Col. 6:14 (“As view of a telephone answering device
illustrated in Fig. 3. ..”). Thus, the term “illustrating” would not seem to necessarily lead to the
conclusion that claim scope is limited to the “illustrated” embodiments.
The specification does not teach that the specific embodiment described in the figures is
somehow important or vital to what is claimed. Put another way, the specification does not teach
that this embodiment is the only way to accomplish the answer mode of the invention. Indeed, as
already pointed out, Vonage does not request that all features shown in Figures 3A and 3B be
incorporated into “the invention” as claimed. If Figures 3A and 3B were considered as illustrating
“the invention” instead of simply an embodiment, the Court would not be at liberty to pick and
3B to include and which to not include. And the choose which aspects of Figures 3A and
specification does not provide guidance as to how such determinations might be made.
prosecution of the ‘576 patent, Klausner expressly Vonage also asserts that during

9Case 2:06-cv-00275-LED-JDL Document116 Filed 08/07/07 Page 9 of 23 PagelD #:
distinguished methods of automatically answering telephone calls with a “telephone answering
a computer-based voice messaging system. See Ex. 2 to Vonage’s device” from methods using
Claim Constr. Br. at 12. The Court disagrees. The cited excerpt from the prosecution history shows
was no motivation or suggestion to combine a 1981 patent issued the inventors arguing that there
5,003,577 issued to Ertz. The Court does not find this portion of to Klausner and U.S. Patent No.
the prosecution history to disclaim computer based voice messaging systems, but rather to be
addressing the examiner’s conclusion that certain claims were obvious in light of the referenced prior
art.
The Court is not persuaded that one skilled in the art would read the intrinsic evidence as
exclusion or restriction such that the answer mode of the invention containing explicit expressions of
was limited to the embodiment set forth in Figures 3A and 3B. Cf Scimed Life Sys., Inc. v.
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc.,242 F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that the common
specification leads to the “inescapable conclusion” that patents had disclaimed a particular
configuration). Further, the Court finds this phrase understandable to a juror in the context of the
claims at issue and, therefore, does not require construction.
2. “telephone answering device”
By the time of the hearing, Klausner proposed that this term be construed as “an electronic
device for answering telephone calls,” while Vonage proposed “a device for answering an incoming
telephone call.” Vonage does not appear to seriously dispute the inclusion of “electronic” in the
definition of this term. Nor does there appear to be any serious dispute to including the word
as the preamble of Claim 3 describes “storing and retrieving “incoming” in the definition
calls with a telephone answering device.” Throughout the information from the incoming telephone

10‘576 patent, the telephone answering device is described as a device that can receive, store and
retrieve messages left by a calling party, i.e., messages coming in to a called party. See, e.g., ‘576
patent, col. 5:23-31, 34-40. Accordingly, the Court construes this term as “an electronic device for
answering an incoming telephone call.”
3. “coupled to a telephone”
Klausner proposes “connected to a telephone so that signals are transferred from one to the
other,” while Vonage proposes “connected to the called party’s telephone line.” The primary dispute
here is whether the telephone access device (“TAD”) is connected to the “called party’s telephone
line.” Vonage argues that the TAD must be connected to the “called party’s telephone line” because
the specification limits the invention to the answer mode described in Figures 3A and 3B. For the
reasons discussed above, the Court rejects this argument. In light of the preamble’s description of
the method as one of “automatically answering incoming telephone calls and storing and retrieving
information from the incoming telephone calls,” the Court finds Klausner’s proposal to be deficient
specification simply describes the telephone answering device as being as well. The patent
connected to the telephone line that receives an incoming call. ‘576 patent, col. 5:41-44.
Accordingly, the Court construes this term as “connected to a telephone receiving an incoming call.”
A, “first signals”
term needs no construction. Vonage proposes “signals received Klausner contends that the
with a voice message recognizable by the telephone answering device and generally unique to the
proposal, Vonage cites to a portion of the specification that provides “[i]t is caller.” To support its
to be understood that any incoming signals over the telephone line with a voice message that is
and is generally unique to the caller may be used instead of DTMF tones.” recognizable by the TAD

11See Col. 9:51-54.
The claim language itself describes the “first signals” as “specifying each caller of each
incoming call.” See Col. 13:47-48. The Court fails to see how the portion of the specification cited
by Vonage does anything more than clarify that signals other than “DTMF tones” may be used to
specify the caller. To hold that this statement constitutes the exclusive definition of the term would
seem to clearly import unnecessary limitations into the claim language. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at
1323. Moreover, the proposed limitations, “recognizable by the telephone answering device” and
“generally unique to the caller,” are ambiguous and could inject confusion into the construction.
The Court notes that in the prosecution history of the ‘236 patent’, the Applicant describes
“signal” as a “[g]eneral term referring to a conveyor of information.” See Ex. 12 to Klausner’s
Claim Constr. Br. at 7. Also, the Applicant refers to “caller identity information,” “identifying
information” and “caller identifying information.” See Ex. 6 to Klausner Opening Br., p. 21, and Ex.
7 to Klausner Opening Br., p. 20.
the meaning of “first signals” in the context of the patent is The Court finds that
“information.”
5. “corresponding voice message”
construction, while Vonage urges “the voice message received by the Klaunser proposes no
telephone answering device with the first signal.” The Court finds that a construction is necessary
to avoid potential confusion as to what the voice message corresponds to. The patent specification
describes the telephone answering device receiving voice messages and DTMF tones during a cal!
e.g., ‘576 patent, col. 7:19-51. Thus, the Court adopts Vonage’s and linking them together. See,
“The ‘576 patent is a continuation of the application that resulted in the “236 patent.
1]

12proposal and construes this term to mean “the voice message received by the telephone answering
device with the first signal.”
6. “user remote access device”
Klausner proposes “a device that can from any remote location gain authenticated access to
internal system resources from outside the system that does not require separate data and voice
channels to communicate with the telephone answering device.” Vonages proposes “the user remote
access device having the structure specified in Claim 1.” In support ofits proposal, Vonage contends
that “user remote access device” is not discussed in the written description’ but is expressly defined
only in terms of means-plus-function elements in Claim 1. Vonage argues that because there is a
presumption that the same terms appearing in different claims have the same meanings, the term
“user remote access device” should be defined in all claims as it is in Claim 1. Vonage’s argument
is without merit.
on the idea that a “user remote access device” is different from Vonage’s argument hinges
a “remote access device.” See Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 448 F.3d 1324, 1333
n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the use
of .. . different terms in the claims connotes different meanings”). Although different terms in a
patent are presumed to have different meanings, that presumption is overcome in this case. Claim
2, which depends from Claim 1, references the “user remote access device” of Claim | by calling
Moreover, independent Claims 5 and 20 use the terms “remote access it a “remote access device.”
device” and “user remote access device” interchangeably within the same claim. Thus, Vonage’s
proposed construction would have the effect of importing the limitations of Claim 1 into all claims
>The term “remote access device” is discussed but not “user remote access device.”

13when claims 2 and 5-13 include a “remote access device” that contains different elements.
Vonage also argues that the prosecution history shows that Claim 1 defines this term because
the inventors amended Claim 1 to clarify that a “user remote access device” includes the means-plus-
d by Klausner, however, the examiner expressed function elements in part (b) of Claim 1. As note
with the term “system independent user remote access device.” (“Regarding claim 15 concern
Claim 1], it is not clear if a ‘user remote access device (line 11)’ and “‘a system-independent [current
- o Klausner’s Reply Br. at 4, In response, the remote access device (line 15) are the same.”). Ex. 27 t
removed “system independent” to “make the claim language consistent.” Ex. 7 to inventors
t conclude that such an amendment reflects an Klausner’s Claim Constr. Br. at 20. The Court canno
Claim 3 in terms of the means-plus-function intention to define the “user remote access device” of
limitations of Claim 1.
Finally, contrary to Vonage’s contention, Claim 1 is not defining a “user remote access
device” or a “remote access device.” Instead, the claim sets forth elements included in the “user
access device” for purposes of that claim. A claim’s elements establish the boundaries of that remote
particular claim term. Indeed, Claims 2 and claim, Jnnova, 381 F.3d at 1115, rather than define a
s device” but none of these claims purport to 5-13 set forth different elements of a “remote acces
define the term. Vonage does not cite to any authority holding that means-plus-function elements
in an independent claim can be used to define a term appearing in another independent claim.°
a rebuttable presumption that different claims are of different scope.” Amgen, Inc. v. “There is
The Court finds this situation distinguishable from the case cited by Vonage, PODS, inc. v. Porta Store, Inc., 484
(Fed. Cir. 2007). In that case, the parties agreed on the definition of “carrier frame” in Claim 1 and there F.3d 1359 was no reason to fail to apply that definition to the term as used in another claim. Here, the parties have not agreed on a definition for “user access remote device” and Vonage is attempting to restrict the meaning of a term by way of an independent claim’s means-plus-function elements, not by way of some sort of definition.

14Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Vonage has not rebutted this
presumption here.
The construction proposed by Klausner suffers from its own deficiencies. Klausner proposes
“a device that can from any remote location gain authenticated access to internal system resources
from outside the system and that does not require separate data and voice channels to communicate
with the telephone answering device.” Klausner points principally to the prosecution history to
support various aspects of its proposed construction. However, the Court does not find adequate
support for certain aspects of Klausner’s proposal. Klausner refers to an Amendment, dated April
3, 1995, in which the Applicant distinguishes a prior art reference to Jachmann. In his argument, the
Applicant said that “Jachmann does not disclose a flexible and system-independent remote device
that may be used from any remote location to access any TAD wherein visual messages are displayed
on the system-independent remote device.” See Ex. 6 to Klausner Opening Br., p. 28. But, in this
particular argument, the Applicant actually relied on two specific differences to distinguish
Jachmann; namely the “system-independent” remote device, and the fact that, in Jachmann, “remote
retrieval of information must be accomplished without use of any visual messages.” Jd. The
“system-independent” aspect of the claims at issue was deleted in a subsequent Amendment.
Klausner points to its expert Levine as support for that portion of its proposal reciting “from
location gain authenticated access to internal system resources from outside the system.” any remote
Klausner points to nothing specific in the intrinsic record to support these restrictions, However,
other than the notion that access to voice messages is typically intended to be limited or controlled.
The reference to “internal system resources” does not aid in the understanding of the subject claim
term, at least in the context of the asserted claims of the ‘576 patent. Those claims do not expressly15 recite a “system,” nor is a “system” implicitly required. Hence, inclusion of a requirement of

“authenticated access to internal system resources from outside the system” interjects limitations not
reasonably connected to any other claim requirement and will likely only cause confusion to a lay
jury. Certainly the word “remote” carries with it the connotation that some distance, and perhaps
a considerable distance, may exist between the remote access device and the telephone answering
device. Dr. Levine, Klausner’s expert, describes that distance as “any distant location” and having
“no range limit on access.” Levine Decl. 451. Klausner’s proposed language of “from any remote
location” adequately describes this limitation.
Finally, Klausner proposes that the term “remote access device” be construed to require that
the device “does not require separate data and voice channels to communicate with the telephone
answering device.” Klausner points to an Amendment dated November 10, 1995, in which the
Applicant again distinguished the Jachmann reference. Klausner points to the Applicant’s statement
that “in the preferred embodiment of Jachmann, two separate data paths are required for retrieving
voice messages.” Therefore, argues Klausner, the “remote access device” of the claims must not
require two separate channels. However, in the November 10, 1995 Amendment, the Applicant went
on to acknowledge that a second embodiment shown by Jachmann “arguably uses only a telephone
link to convey both voice and data information.” See Ex. 7 to Klausner Opening Br., pp. 24-25. But,
said the Applicant, in that second embodiment of J achmann, the user may be restricted in his use of
the single telephone link to only certain times of the day. Thus, the Applicant argued that the
distinction between the claimed invention and the disclosure of Jachmann lie in the fact that, in the
claimed invention, the “first signals are available upon user demand.” Jd. The prosecution history
is insufficient to show that the Applicant surrendered claim scope regarding the number of channels16 required for transmission of voice and data. See Sorenson v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 427 F.3d 1375,

1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“in order to disavow claim scope, a patent applicant must clearly and
unambiguously express surrender of subject matter during prosecution’’).
For the reasons expressed above, the Court construes the terms “user remote access device”
and “remote access device” identically to mean “a device that can gain access to voice messages
stored on the telephone answering device from a remote location.”
7. “transmitting said received first signals to a user remote access device”
Klausner advocates no construction, while Vonages proposes “the telephone answering
device outputs the first signals over a single telephone link to a user remote access device.” Vonage
contends that the prosecution history shows that the first signals must be transmitted over a single
telephone link. The Court disagrees.
The prosecution history excerpt cited by Vonage demonstrates that first signals may be
transmitted over a single telephone link. See Ex. 3 to Def.’s Claim Constr. Br. at 24-25 (“the
presently claimed invention may use a single telephone link for conveying both voice and data
information’’and “the presently claimed invention places no limitation whatsoever on when a user
may retrieve messages using a single telephone link”). See also the above discussion of these
passages from the prosecution history. Further, the prosecution history provides that “signals may
be transmitted through any medium, including but not limited to, DTMF tones over a telephone line,
radio waves, etc.” See Ex. 8 to Klausner’s Claim Constr. Br. at 11-12. Thus, the Court declines to
adopt Vonage’s proposal and finds this phrase needs no construction apart from the constructions
of “first signals” and “user remote access device” already given.

178. “transmitting to a user remote access device at least one specific voice message linked to a
specific one of said received first signals”
Klausner argues this term needs no construction apart from the construction of “user remote
access device.” Vonage proposes “the telephone answering device plays back the voice message to
the user remote access device over the single telephone link between the telephone answering device
and user remote access device.”
Among other things, Vonage proposes that this phrase requires “play back” by the telephone
answering device. While “play back” of a voice message may be one action taken to accomplish the
transmission of the voice message, the concept of “play back” does not appear to be inherent in the
word “transmitting,” nor does Vonage point to anything in the intrinsic record, aside from a specific
embodiment described in the specification, suggesting otherwise. The Court declines to incorporate
details of a disclosed embodiment into a claim term in the absence of clear direction otherwise from
the intrinsic record. See, e.g., Varco, L.P. v. Pason Sys. USA, Corp., 436 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (“In examining the specification for proper context . . . this court will not at any time import
limitations from the specification into the claims.”). Vonage also argues the requirement of using
a “single telephone link” between the telephone answering device” and the “user remote access
device.” That argument has been addressed above.
these reasons as well as those discussed in the previous section, the Court rejects For
Vonage’s proposed construction and finds that this phrase needs no construction.

18| #: <pagelD>
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court interprets the claim language in this case in the manner
set forth above. For ease of reference, the Court’s claim interpretations are set forth in a table
attached to this opinion.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 7th day of August, 2007.
febrP Fre UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

UL
_U
OTJPU OU! U} LIOJUI,, SUB d ,
M HI T aUT
UL SUv OMS
ULI , UI
B SSI
OSE
O] ep I ola
SUBO s UT
0A
U dI QOO B
TBSS ;9}
‘A OP Yds
TA UO
SO o ,
S [B
UB e IS msu O} 2> rze B {[ Su .
sts A J eU D OQT SA .{ NSUO OI} L,
OTO OT ,
U
, UI 109,, yay } , os, OO dSd.1 da I N e, ydn MT PUO uoy IS O U po Su SuT s
8
‘S -J
LS jo °Z
LS‘ y) S Y} O o e UB o
S u S e u UT p , y) u e UIOOU O
OUUR OIOI
T S s AL
u PO d M au, o l A WI mo jje unw pa ond S uni op
I s t]su ola A ue y) d s o W uIs o p e IS ye ul
S da Al UB da Ssa
ae adiU TR _ asp p uoyu e S Aa
- o dap ol u zay y} S Q S U a 001
ULIO IOO Al9 S ] M IVSS PS
ur SUB o TA 7 0d oW o T[e 0 n1 SUG?) sun suv po S I e a TINY zam s ROT su MO urs |. si SU om J S u SuL 0 [e u] , A suy o
s sau ue 2 A Fut o } un ms yn ur v e 0 br SOL uTo D Sy ie T[ on BES S E[ S d I O U ei O
deyj } dis uoy pu ss sp y
d eta
D p IA OS oyd OA BY op ep LISU su I A es OTJO S P U if
a s iod,, o} , y t d y},, oy ys ) ue dsas } oy omy, aza 3U e daja s] u0s N, y ess ipuo U oyd yvu yd u0 yi uoy oyd oou O , o A][ Su O su yvo auo Sur A a su poj , A
LD UO
IE ] Q
W Y
A
O}
0}
UBS ,
S } D,
ey SA
HON y AI INISU G
OD SU o
B Os @ SU eul S]j OM suv BULI
ap Iy dta } O BS
ug a O W SU odo I os ou p soo OIU
es ESSI T Ar AJ j o T T roy ys} J Uur S S du Yda S sre j uo ane SP aja s s W OLA oyd &
IRE S au D v , - samsu v 01 sues
Fuj eo aLay
Sl] f p
py . o usne $,.19 e ut
or uos sue
us rom
p T po * {9 OS SUOD g O.99 MIYSU IITLI p) TM J_oyo } OTOT UON
( O y U
s
j.,, os d,, , sts , O N N aya ,, doy no I0D, u va, O O oyd Ue oy ajd dou pe o J au su p pay s y
M
1 & 9
} B
0
B ve E yo SOU S
- o SES IU s} o A SS j T da[ es M ASE
OOU oY is J r I _ MI su us p Y SUI & s je
no s o yd OA J } po OI Y S A S eo B OUL IO ue M I] yj ESS 3I r’] u Ms S Jo OB SIS sue yjo LIo YI I s U sen po SU q o Te o e y S
GI IT ut
, SIN WO S s v, UIA o or A
S e y IO I] s TT QO S pe s ue I y Al r p _ et ¢ u al P ,, s y,,
OL, asa. e ur SO aq pr ry IAI But su SU
e ¢ s ¢ s ¢ I s109 d] n S a} ya} oad ] R ST o} IOO odsa p) re oj OI OFUI daT sul de e] gr q o U OAT rpu e qui ur ULI EUI oYy oul uoy [ utd [ Y O [ P Su w [a e S UOT su Ar ,a S

B B
,, ,, S SUB
UB SUT S
S OI
OA
s su uo oy yds Q} do QO ]s} OW a} UIO IdL I
,.d ,,II O dTA TA F DP IP
S
‘AIV ‘AIB S990
SSQO SSIO 8
OU OU
B B
9 W
- o O 4 O u I } I S$ } ] SS
9I9 IIIV U
¥ U
U T O
O R
SO sO LA p lAa VO UO pa Sp oa p TJOU TOTU U ro roj YSUO YSUO v }s s D D 9J d
3j0 OUW ULd II.A 1
Je
Su y SuL s La ) sas IoM aSe ms esso msu ssou ue ur e r
SdT
Ja Aa Aa SN SN p ,, ,,
O O
N N do]
UOe _
O _ t U P1 suo } AaP Q SS yd o1 SS9 399D ayo Ss S
Ao 99¥ Q } uLa OT p O OU Ms AD
SUB [S WIS ue P SUL UI I
S
SSII S aj ID ulJ 9}0 olm
om B UIA aa SSO
, [ su I IO a 99B [ | e SN [ p
ISA SU le
aa W I O Is iaa e{ suO p D Yd
oza
B O } u OW d Y t ST Jos as } SO
BU n n 9 MA p ST 4 ap
s u S 0 } rao sad ov } id on t oyd
ota & v JO por y Be AO yrs s ed AIS 0 O s o s N I } F Y IS
s ] SN
Y Su
aj U BNw SO out , UsuD IA Us8 u ad Ydl,, SP M oron
D I0q ysuo Y O P 0s
- o y U O u ) suo S L
s F } Yyd dI unjo syo 0A nys S siI 3
ID s nd ss Sd
4 UT uro yno ooo TA aS IS wl R SP n,, Y
O UT
U ] } @
,, NO ,,
B PISI
A SU
BOU
L
O
W ar
UI nb UBS ari e} Say , , oyd
su aI
u IAa
- o p j y}
o
ap ld p ad OSEI o
SSoIM sa M S
SAI
I IV
y} ye
0H AS
Ssa2 a}s
W ajo
ula d,,
sAs a1 W
ad,, UT } UTOD ou IOP y TUN aj [PU o oyeO
uo Y} O y}dn o QU e J Ul
] sn
a] BO Ja U
p NSqeT S & r OIBAe J l es P e UI RUSIS S
J SSO ST } [BU
OBP , 0 S
O S IS
S E
uyym ISS J usu IIS s esy P SU ,, Op j
dIA OA Vo J OI le O D J J SA
I[
sje T U AS
"sIS [R 999 O]s PIa $8 OI stp loo
P vrd aI
p od e.y,, wo p nusa pue unj
s S
[ p le p re p ]¢ s n ¢
D1 OIOS O ts 9] 0UI sn IIO u [ 9} Jo OA J s

B B
, SUL U ,,
, OU e SU UO SUB ,
BS J Z TCUL ST JO U OU
OI ULI IOJUL I CULIO
OA OM ,, OA JUL,, s SUE s
uo uoy yda Q dsy S} [a OW .dd a} OU } Aal Aa ISI
P
,.3d O ,.dd O 149 } TAD }
P P
SS3 SSA
09R 908
B JO ‘T B
} ]e
a W SUL o s W y IOM y O S } O SU SUB } UBS
$8 e SO SUL $$3 UE 908 IA I9¥ U
U SP su U
TE U oyd T O S O oy R a) S
d1 A
p AS p P aro p alo
UL ys , UL ls _ 9 O O S B 9J D ST
}O TUO U OU BU
UII T}0g B IIA SI I ]9 IS S
T BN Je EU Su O l Su ] s LIa _ S ] so LIo -H ade Ms urm ses Msu ON
ssou ue 0S sou e es r Y Ut r o]
ds D
O A ad ]9 1 O I LS 9 IAe }, JS.A 3 IA S. TL SN p , T SH P AY S ,, T,, ,, ,,
'S U
R
O] ,
TBI
UO
O
Y
S ) U O UO
U OHO U TONY
] LIISU ] SUOS
90 CS
W 8
I 99 ¢ 99
E 8 8
, U
a ID
, [ dia , [
Ale p ap p SSoo A ] d J¢ oU dMAa ¢ Aap
p
u U m
S t r o w o 1 Fut Y y 0 po sam po ] po ) } $ pr su pta S pra 88 ao y oi SaId oi
79 id d 9 Iv d 9
98 0S
S
I
UO [ [e TIOTL | e _ ] YSUO , ]¢ ¢
D s S
ajo yo ajo pp
W wad u u U wa uo ud V oro oYOR dS s rnon ts u Y nysu au NsUO u ysu D os oyd D r cs t aja
y,, p p
ap op ta tao csd id A is 4 is as 4 aS a n,, if n, tf un O d] N N resi L[D {ayqu ,, ,,
SP OpP ISIN IsM
0 O 0 o
o } 0 ] 0 aye } ae ss ] sso du , oo0 008 roy B, R S[O a d SpO OU UU uo 10W UUL
.S ST RYS yds d1 YS or W to W dd O } oI e I] y
poyB poyE
L orUa oTUy BSU YNE S INe Ssd SUA IINO A INO
,U SAI U S|I
,L S B Sd d1 TO
¢ 0A S A
u
w u T ) W re O OT yD I] ] ( Y Qo
AP IM p AS M pu u p I re re W W U W
- ed 94 ES 9Is
Jo SA As
U S y oTeOM u ey
(p T e UMUU le e ) E p IOS s p c* po J S y p yjo IVey ey SU ur SSII) ) LIO
MSU
W oj UO oje P OT} [RU ere TeO [RU red ROO IOI da S OT ISF as
Vo ] ULT s OI UT lAS AS p p
o o n y A,, y ) UID
BJO
Po lol
J s P SI J W I
I] o S O BS I IE S
Ja J A SO Jo sn O I TIU T[ O Spt
p e9 SU S p JO le LIO OU re s p poy MSU S s le TWis B
s ueN p Pl IOS SU r e N O
es S s
Id{ o SIA I Aap u S M P ) ‘[ P
je 0 js
- o J y Jo IO ¥ OS e } ][ dT
Bu N Vd ] rAp p roa Su oie pajy _SOU ds rAv ya eroo SO MU
Say sU yds $ s sse BVS SpT
$99 we OY ip,, 89I SAU I 9" su S da PI 9¥ T e l u {a) es p
id re J q s O
O sar TOT
P ] uep JOQ p 3 9 t ‘sp IOS
30 s sp 9 } eU
wr UII ye RU dI BI ey I us sI AS O S Z IO Jay )> is y s p UI ul IO pe
oe P [q II og A o s re }
s p

B
, SUBO U
, UT B
S
UBS
UL JO SU
LO LIO
A MSU su B oyd Q s]a OU ,.d } al dA
SP
.AI O
TA }
IP
SSB
09¥
& IO ‘[
ye
s W SUL } o y O IGM
$ ] T SUE Q
$9I T
IE U AS s
B U P uoy S O de yay
So
p lAa ar p
W ojs 9 ed O }JO TMO
UII2 NDO
TA
J aUo e S yda y] uL zay soB Iam ,, Sur esso su mo ut e ou
r
OL J 9d S aS TA ‘TL N ap S‘S ,,
U
e ,
d U
B ]
Y
] 9 JU 98
D 9 €
IE 98
U
,a Ne oi ]D
, [ da p p ad ]¢ lda p
u U S t S T
uis f po am pe S pr sun pr
saI aci aci IV d d
A
0 J
aJO W ULa u u A s onon oTjon V ysuo auo suo0 [ Y s yda S ajq ja} ure
,, sid ]
4a 8N
,, w ne lD
Op Is]N SU
0 o ROU
I
sa ] O SUL yne ISM ae ® ssa ] SU dw doR P oy ,, 3 S[O au
0U s UUR oy S IeI im YD ds UBO W b [s} ao UL O er iaa
] p
paye orua yNe Ss
A oINO JO , U Sal 1 , a B 0U SOIO Fu } da A o pla p Y usu SO
UW s } yv LA IO s0 SP IT p Y
I
p M uk
S e <S - $aII U W y ][e u e S]S y o
AS ) o SIUO ( u vy TeoT p TON p le e UNTI Aa I9 ) s p OS Sot s' y _auo p ey wa yda ) ysA zay auo
s ,, yd
ajo UO ay aya ula NeO [eU eie } t,, B OT IOF das
OT UT
AO p a o U
UE e,
y u MS ,
) LIO
SU
Sur s jus 0 uo ued su yda } LIo ya Ms p y P Due ajo
I IJA a[a LS OP s
0 } , B SU OSR
p DIA LIO B SS re A O MS sU IUL s P UL OY q de yo
]D} e
g so Sur 1ao pon p uos ,, $$9 A
998 v
SD
IO
S sU p A uta OT re ms daT s 0 ue A9 }
94 09. s 1 orA Pd
osn op I0} eo s
[9 ]
p

OL
S‘T
ZL
S‘S
suo
‘a yda m ls) [eu aa layU Sa
s p Sai T ynu jM jou su yiu apl 9 s oyd apt ID is ay W s} d A2 } 10A
S
ulia J p ms o p u Is
1 up u e ]JOU sa e 4 OS y aAn 4 ‘S] aj P f onp aj DU joo adO
‘W ur j09 SI W IS O yu S OW
p Ud y da S Iv ” A Q s “
“(Sja “(S)j (S)a injo ono su ijon
nyg suo s nyg ld P ng
a yd uip vid
Bu uo eya iao I sip IS A laj yda i rd S ed A aza jay ‘ 41 s 0 a ors f ip y no ‘Ios se) ‘Joss
seoo oooi YI idoro P doro M nu ID rul
JA S
BY p D “( par u Teo DpIz e
M p p mn TM 0 p T 0ssp Sa po OTO ip oso os,s OW 1 oso HO sns so UT s do SUN dor U sou doi Y ig Ja p g ] g A
yd ay ey no pja ds
- o d ip
w os
W f| IE
TD A
| S u S A St A ty it u q u } e } e } e
saA U U U Ne ye Je Je 9 red L y 9 L y 3 I y ul)d ) q } q ) q y | | |
W 0 W 0 U 0
Ie 2d } r DA } NL VA ] [D atj elD dTP [D ST[ aq p Oq P Og P a I S
oU oU U
Su Su Sut tjro | no | po | ss Jo ss JO sse JO e u W H e U W IL U W I
e]D ]D LD
sa Sa sa op 0p op
- j U j U j U
o o o T u p I u p I u p (p u u u P e Su e sU e SU )s le IIO LIO ‘p s } s } s ] “p t t t onn
uO UO uO suo
NU H U n Jnu HE s Ie esH re esH re sNH ]g T y IT yg y
a O O y y U ] } R
9 N J JO Jo Y o
| ‘eo IIQ P 1A IS UII I le ap A VAL S s AT
au 1 Ja
UO BY J9 y[e yds ) ][V o ]9) 9I W
I
PI P M
VS E
ss Y S ooo IN S v s Z IPES
S urA SIUI
S II AIP epd paj UTA B IA0 0 sip eDo IN pu Ad } sse INA eu d lop
p dIA Pa
aj ‘sas le Ip SL jvp our tid s U os 9l uros TS
W II
O IO
S A
A uLI .1 1 1
J O IMS asn 0 S 0 sa as Z UB IS ; o y ynu T n A n ap
!
S ST s s P
a y UR EU uvo uvsa I.1 re o AT SI a w ut 01 , & r S o S
. p dn M
re op
(q s ! )