NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
TOUCHMUSIC ENTERTAINMENT LLC,
Plaintiff
ZIKLAG IP LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
APPLE INC. AND AMAZON WEB SERVICES, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees
2025-1733, 2025-1734
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Nos. 1:24-cv-01786, 1:24-cv-01787, Judge Steven C. Seeger.
Decided: November 19, 2026
ANDRES C. PEREIRA, Watts LLP, Austin, TX, for plaintiff-appellant.
KEVIN SCOTT PRUSSIA, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Boston, MA, for defendant-appellee Apple Inc. Also represented by MARK CHRISTOPHER FLEMING.
2ROBERT CRUZEN, Klarquist Sparkman, LLP, Portland, OR, for defendant-appellee Amazon Web Services, Inc. Also represented by CAROLINE DESMOND.
Before LOURIE, STOLL, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
Ziklag IP LLC appeals final judgments from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I
On March 2, 2024, Touchmusic filed two complaints in the Northern District of Illinois. One complaint accused Apple Inc. of infringing U.S. Patent No. 6,182,128, and the other accused Amazon Web Services, Inc. of infringing the ’128 patent. The district court assigned both cases to the Honorable Steven C. Seeger.
Notably, the ’128 patent had expired nearly six years earlier on March 5, 2018. Additionally, when Touchmusic filed these complaints, its corporate rights were suspended under California law, thereby prohibiting it from initiating litigation.
This did not deter Touchmusic. Rather than dismissing the cases, on April 18, 2024, Touchmusic assigned certain rights in the ’128 patent to the newly incorporated Ziklag. Touchmusic and Ziklag thereafter filed amended complaints that substituted Ziklag for Touchmusic as the plaintiff.
Apple and Amazon moved to dismiss the amended complaints. Amazon argued in part that Touchmusic did not assign Ziklag the right to sue for past damages. On March 31, 2025, the district court granted Amazon’s motion to dismiss, agreeing that Ziklag did not receive the3 right to sue for past damages—which was fatal because the ’128 patent was long expired. Ziklag IP LLC v. Amazon Web Servs., Inc., 776 F. Supp. 3d 745, 754–55 (N.D. Ill. 2025). The district court also determined that, “[f]or the same reasons” provided in its order granting Amazon’s motion, Ziklag’s infringement claim against Apple “fails.” J.A. 15. The district court therefore dismissed both cases with prejudice.
II
Amazon and Apple were not the only targets of Touch-music’s litigation efforts—Touchmusic also accused Netflix, Inc. of infringing the ’128 patent in the Northern District of Illinois. Complaint for Patent Infringement, Ziklag IP LLC v. Netflix, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-01789, Dkt. No. 1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2024). The district court assigned that case to the Honorable Mary M. Rowland.
We discuss the procedural history of Netflix in Ziklag IP LLC v. Netflix, Inc., No. 25-1960 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 19, 2026), issued concurrently with this opinion. Notably, while the district court in that case also determined that Touchmusic did not assign Ziklag the right to sue for past damages, see Ziklag IP LLC v. Netflix, Inc. (“Netflix Opinion”), No. 24-cv-01789, 2025 WL 904311, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 25, 2025), Ziklag did not challenge that determination on appeal. Instead, Ziklag raised only a single issue: “Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Appellant Ziklag IP LLC the right to amend its complaint to resubstitute prior plaintiff Touchmusic Entertainment LLC as the proper plaintiff in this matter.” Appellant’s Corrected Opening Br. & Add. 2, Ziklag IP LLC v. Netflix, Inc., No. 25-1960 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 16, 2025).
III
In view of Ziklag’s failure to challenge the assignment determination in Netflix, we ordered the parties in this case to “file supplemental briefs limited to addressing4 whether Touchmusic and Ziklag are collaterally estopped from arguing that the district court erred in holding that Touchmusic did not assign Ziklag the right to sue for past damages.” ECF No. 41 at 2. The parties filed supplemental briefs thereafter. ECF Nos. 53–55, 59, 62, 63.
IV
Ziklag appeals the district court’s judgments in the Apple and Amazon cases. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
Ziklag raises one issue on appeal: “Whether the trial court erred in holding that the assignee of an expired patent cannot sue for past infringement because the written assignment from the assignor to the assignee did not expressly state that the assignee was granted the right to sue for past infringement.” Appellant’s Br. 1. However, we must first determine whether collateral estoppel precludes Ziklag from challenging the district court’s determination. We hold that collateral estoppel applies.
The “general rule is that ‘[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.’” B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 148 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 (1980), then referring to exceptions stated in § 28). However, collateral estoppel does not just apply between the parties; rather, “the loser in the first case [may be] precluded from relitigating an issue even in a later action that does not involve its first-case adversary.” Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 924 F.3d 1243, 1251 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (first citing Blonder-Tongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349–50 (1971); and5 then citing XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, 890 F.3d 1282, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
“Because the application of collateral estoppel is not a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of this court, this court applies the law of the circuit in which the district court sits,” here, the Seventh Circuit. Bayer AG. v. Biovail Corp., 279 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1381 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). Under Seventh Circuit law, collateral estoppel applies where “(1) the issue sought to be precluded is the same as that involved in a prior action; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment; and (4) the party against whom estoppel is invoked was represented in the prior action.” Adair v. Sherman, 230 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 2000).
Apple and Amazon argue, and Ziklag does not dispute, that factors (2)–(4) of the Seventh Circuit’s standard are satisfied.1 We agree with Apple and Amazon that each of6 these factors are met. Therefore, we consider whether the first factor—“the issue sought to be precluded is the same as that involved in a prior action”—has been satisfied.
According to Ziklag, this factor has not been satisfied and “[t]he question is whether Ziklag’s failure to challenge [the assignment determination] in the co-pending Netflix appeal converts that proceeding into ‘prior litigation’ that precludes this [c]ourt from deciding the issue in these appeals.” Appellant’s Suppl. Opening Br. 2 (italics added). Ziklag argues that our decisions in Innovad Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 260 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2001) and In re Cygnus Telecommunications Technology, LLC, Patent Litigation, 536 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008) compel us to determine that collateral estoppel does not apply. We disagree.
In Innovad, we declined to apply collateral estoppel where the plaintiff failed to appeal a judgment of non-infringement as to one of several co-defendants sued in the same district court case. 260 F.3d at 1334. There was “no ‘first’ or ‘second’ action for the purpose of issue preclusion,” as appellees were only characterizing “other components of the decision below [in the case against all defendants] as prior litigation.” Id. Similarly, in Cygnus, the plaintiff did not appeal a judgment against one defendant in a consolidated multidistrict litigation. 536 F.3d at 1349. We declined to find that the plaintiff’s claims against other defendants in that same consolidated district court action were precluded: “Because the multiple actions filed against various defendants were all consolidated in a single MDL proceeding, we believe that for purposes of analysis of preclusion doctrines, the proceeding is most logically viewed as a single, multi-defendant lawsuit.” Id.
7This appeal is distinguishable from Innovad and Cygnus. First, the cases against Apple, Amazon, and Netflix are not “a single, multi-defendant lawsuit.” Id. To the contrary, Touchmusic filed separate complaints against Apple, Amazon, and Netflix—none of which were consolidated by the district court. See Papst, 924 F.3d at 1251 (distinguishing Cygnus on the basis that the agency proceedings were not consolidated, but rather “were distinct ‘cases’ separately resolved”). Second, not only were the cases not consolidated, but Netflix proceeded before a different judge. Third, the Netflix district court determined the assignment issue and dismissed Ziklag’s complaint prior to the Amazon and Apple district court dismissals. While the Netflix district court did not enter a final judgment until June 24, 2025, after the district court dismissed Amazon and Apple, the Netflix assignment determination will still be incorporated within our mandate in that appeal. See supra, note 1.2 Fourth, while Ziklag argues that applying collateral estoppel would create “the precise inefficiency Innovad and Cygnus rejected,” Appellant’s Suppl. Resp. Br. 2, Ziklag has not asserted that it “ask[ed] its adversaries to waive reliance on preclusion,” thereby undermining its efficiency arguments. Papst, 924 F.3d at 1252. Thus, this case is closer to the hypothetical discussed in Cygnus, in which we “recognize[d] that the result would be different if the various actions had not been consolidated in an MDL proceeding and one of the actions had gone to judgment before the others, resulting in a judgment adverse to the plaintiff.” Cygnus, 536 F.3d at 1350 n.1 (emphasis added). Accordingly, all collateral estoppel factors are satisfied.
Finally, were we to decline to apply collateral estoppel and reverse on the merits, there would be an untenable inconsistency between this appeal and Netflix. In Netflix, the8 district court’s determination that Touchmusic retained the right to sue for past damages is undisturbed. However, if we consider the merits, reverse, and remand in this appeal, then Ziklag would necessarily have the right to sue for past damages. That means two entities would simultaneously own an undivided right to sue for past damages, which cannot be correct and is precisely the type of inconsistency collateral estoppel is meant to prevent. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (“[R]es judicata and collateral estoppel relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.”).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Ziklag’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. Because Ziklag is collaterally estopped from challenging the district court’s holding that it cannot sue for past damages, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
Footnotes
- ↩ 1 Ziklag refers to the Netflix Opinion as an “interlocutory ruling.” Appellant’s Suppl. Resp. Br. 1–2. To the extent this may be interpreted as challenging whether the third collateral estoppel factor—“the determination of the issue was essential to the final judgment”—is met, we disagree. The Netflix district court would not have reached the amended complaint issue if it had not first decided that Touchmusic retained the right to sue for past damages. Therefore, the ruling was essential to the Netflix final judgment. And because Ziklag failed to challenge the district court’s determination that Touchmusic retained the right to sue for past damages in the Netflix appeal, that determination will be incorporated within this court’s mandate in Netflix. See Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 166 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Unless remanded by this court, all issues within the scope of the appealed judgment are deemed incorporated within the mandate and thus are precluded from further adjudication.”).
- ↩ 2 Moreover, the Netflix district court entered final judgment before Ziklag filed its opening brief here.